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Abstract
This Comment argues that the Francovich judgment logically proceeds from the Treaty and
general principles of Community law. Part I discusses the state of Community law prior to the
Francovich decision. Part II examines the factual background of the decision, the judgment of the
Court, and the opinion of Advocate General Mischo. Part III argues that the principle of liability
in damages for a breach of Community law is a logical extension of the Treaty and the Court of
Justice caselaw. This Comment concludes that private law remedies or their equivalent must be
made available for breaches of Community law and that any conflicting liability schemes in the
Member States must be brought into conformity with the Francovich judgment.
FRANCOVICH AND BONIFACI v. ITALY: EEC MEMBER
STATE LIABILITY FOR FAILURE TO
IMPLEMENT COMMUNITY
DIRECTIVES
INTRODUCTION
One of the major difficulties facing the European Eco-
nomic Community (the "Community" or "EEC") is the en-
forcement of its directives.' A directive is binding upon each
Member State as to the result to be achieved, but leaves the
form and method of implementation to the discretion of the
national authorities.2 When a Member State fails to implement
a Community directive, the Commission of the European
Communities may bring suit against the Member State before
the Court ofJustice.3 If the Court of Justice determines that a
Member State has failed to fulfill its obligations under the
Treaty Establishing the European Economic Community,4 the
Member State will be required to take measures necessary to
comply with the judgment.5
Proceedings to enforce compliance with EEC obligations
are widely invoked, yet their effects can be minimal because a
deliberately disobedient Member State can refuse to comply
with the judgment. 6 Directives may have a dangerously elastic
1. See Deirdre Curtin, Directives: The Effectiveness of Judicial Protection of Individual
Rights, 27 COMMON MKT. L. REV. 709, 711 (1990).
2. Treaty Establishing the European Economic Community, art. 189, Mar. 25,
1957, 1973 Gr. Brit. T.S. No. 1 (Cmd. 5179-I1), 298 U.N.T.S. 3 (1958) [hereinafter
EEC Treaty or Treaty]. Article 189 provides that "[a] directive shall be binding, as to
the result to be achieved, upon each Member State to which it is addressed, but shall
leave to the national authorities the choice of form and methods." Id. art. 189. The
Member State must achieve the result sought by the directive within the time period
prescribed by the directive. Ursula Becker v. Finanzamt Miinster-Innenstadt, Case 8/
81, [1982] E.C.R. 53, 70, [1982] 1 C.M.L.R. 499, 512.
3. EEC Treaty, supra note 2, art. 169; see Alan Dashwood and Robin White, En-
forcement Actions under Articles 169 and 170 EEC, 14 EUR. L. REV. 388, 389 (1989) (dis-
cussing Member State's obligations under Article 169, which allows Commission to
institute action against Member State for failing to fulfill its obligations under EEC
Treaty); see also infra part I.C (discussing Article 169 proceedings). Infringement pro-
ceedings have occurred more frequently after 1977 due to the policies of the Com-
mission. Dashwood and White, supra, at 411 n.59. However, a resolution of the
problem through infringement proceedings may take years. Cf id.
4. EEC Treaty, supra note 2.
5. Id. art. 171.
6. Curtin, supra note 1, at 711. In 1990, 334 infringement procedures were
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quality, as Member States may vote to adopt a directive with
which they are uncomfortable knowing that the penalty for fail-
ing to implement it is minimal or non-existent. 7 This non-
compliance of the Member States threatens both the solidarity
of the EEC and the rights of individuals under Community
law. 8 Non-compliance with Community provisions results in
discrimination against nationals of non-compliant Member
States, as these individuals are unable to take advantage of the
rights that Community law can confer upon them.9 The Court
of Justice has taken incremental steps to reduce the impact of
non-compliance.' 0 One such action by the Court was to allow
certain Treaty articles and directives to have a "direct effect"
within the Member State." t An article or directive may have a
direct effect only if it is unconditional, sufficiently precise, and
confers rights upon the individual.' 2 Once these conditions
are met, an individual could then rely directly upon the provi-
sions of the article or directive; however, a requirement of
compensation in damages was not expressly granted by the
Court of Justice.' 3
In Andrea Francovich and Danila Bonifaci v. Italy, 4 the Court
ofJustice held Member States liable to individuals for damages
caused by the Member States' failure to implement a Commu-
nity directive that is not sufficiently precise so as to confer
rights directly upon individuals.'-' This obligation to make res-
opened on the basis of Article 169 of the EEC Treaty. Id. at 710. More than half the
infringement proceedings over the course of the three years ending in 1990 have
concerned failures by Member States to implement directives into national law. Id.
7. See G. Federico Mancini, The Making of a Constitution for Europe, 26 COMMON
MKT. L. REV. 595, 602 (1989). A Member State reluctant to implement a certain
directive may exploit the discretion granted it by partially implementing the directive
while excluding the terms deemed repugnant. Nicholas Green, Directives, Equity and
the Protection of Individual Rights, 9 EUR. L. REV. 295, 298 (1984).
8. Curtin, supra note 1, at 711.
9. Nicholas Green & Ami Barav, Damages in the National Courts for Breach of Commu-
nity Law, 1986 Y.B. OF EUR. L. 55.
10. See infra part I.B (discussing Court of Justice's protection of Community
rights).
11. See id.
12. See id.
13. See infra note 76 and accompanying text (describing right to compensation
for breach of Community law).
14. Joined Cases C-6 & 9/90 (Eur. Ct.J. Nov. 19, 1991) (not yet reported) (ref-
erences are from unofficial translation by the author).
15. Id. slip op. 48.
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titution, the Court stated, was both express and inherent in the
Treaty.' 6 Francovich grants individuals the right to enforce
unimplemented directives before their national courts, thereby
providing an indirect method of compelling Member States to
implement directives within the prescribed time period. 7
This Comment argues that the Francovich judgment logi-
cally proceeds from the Treaty and general principles of Com-
munity law. Part I discusses the state of Community law prior
to the Francovich decision. Part II examines the factual back-
ground of the decision, the judgment of the Court, and the
opinion of Advocate General Mischo. Part III argues that the
principle of liability in damages for a breach of Community law
is a logical extension of the Treaty and the Court of Justice
caselaw. This Comment concludes that private law remedies
or their equivalent must be made available for breaches of
Community law and that any conflicting liability schemes in the
Member States must be brought into conformity with the
Francovich judgment.
I. THE STATE OF COMMUNITY L4 W PRIOR TO
FRANCOVICH
Article 5 of the Treaty requires Member States to take all
general or particular measures that are appropriate to fulfill
their Community law obligations.' 8 In addition, Member
States must abstain from any measures that are likely to jeop-
ardize the attainment of the Treaty obligations.' 9 When a
Member State fails to fulfill these obligations, the Commission
may bring proceedings against the Member State under Article
169.20 Although individuals and undertakings have no stand-
ing to bring such proceedings,2 ' the Court of Justice has read
16. Id. 35-36.
17. Id.
18. EEC Treaty, supra note 2, art. 5. The goals of the Treaty are set out in Arti-
cles 2 and 3. Id. arts. 2, 3. The goals of the Treaty include the establishment of a
common market, the promotion of economic development, an increase in economic
stability, the acceleration of the raising of the standard of living, and promoting
closer relations among the Member States. Id.
19. Id. art. 5.
20. Id. art. 169. Article 169 provides that "[i]f the State concerned does not
comply with the opinion [of the Commission] within the period laid down by the
Commission, the latter may bring the matter before the Court of Justice." Id.
21. Id.
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the provisions of the Treaty broadly to expand rights and give
Community law its full effect. 22 Individual rights are enforced
by the national courts of the Member States according to the
procedures and remedies provided under national law.2 '
A. Member States' Obligations Under the EEC Treaty
The Community requires Member States to fulfill their
Treaty obligations by giving full effect to Community law.2 4
Article 189 of the Treaty authorizes the institutions of the
Community to adopt regulations, issue directives, make deci-
sions, and formulate recommendations or opinions. 2' A regu-
lation is binding in its entirety and directly applicable in all
Member States.26 A directive, on the other hand, is binding
upon each Member State as to the result to be achieved, but
leaves the form and method of implementation to the discre-
tion of the national authorities.2 7 A decision is binding upon
those to whom it is addressed, generally the parties to the deci-
28sion.
A Member State can breach its obligations under the
Treaty when the Member State fails to implement a regulation,
directive, or a decision.2 9 These obligations arise from several
sources, including Article 5, which imposes on each Member
22. See, e.g., Van Gend en Loos v. Nederlandse Administratie der Belastingen,
Case 26/62, [1963] E.C.R. 1, [1963] C.M.L.R. 105 (creating doctrine of direct effect
for certain Treaty articles); see also Von Colson and Kamann v. Land Nordhein West-
falen, Case 14/83, [1984] E.C.R. 1891, 1909, [1986] 2 C.M.L.R. 430, 453 (requiring
national courts to interpret national legislation in manner consistent with provisions
of directive in question); Ursula Becker v. Finanzamt Miinster-Innenstadt, Case 8/8 1,
[1982] E.C.R. 53, 70, [1982] 1 C.M.L.R. 499, 512 (expanding direct effect doctrine to
include certain directives); infra part I.B (discussing Court of Justice's expansion of
individual rights).
23. E.g., Rewe-Zentralfinanz eG and Rewe-Zentral AG v. Landwirtschaftskam-
mer fir das Saarland, Case 33/76, [1976] E.C.R. 1989, 1997-98, [1977] 1 C.M.L.R.
533, 550.
24. See, e.g., EEC Treaty, supra note 2, arts. 5, 169-171; Commission v. Italy,
Case 39/72, [1973] E.C.R. 101, [1973] C.M.L.R. 439 [hereinafter Slaughtered Cows].
25. EEC Treaty, supra note 2, art. 189.
26. EEC Treaty, supra note 2, art. 189; see, e.g., Slaughtered Cows, [1973] E.C.R. at
116, [1973] C.M.L.R. at 457.
27. EEC Treaty, supra note 2, art. 189; see, e.g., Ursula Becker v. Finanzamt Miun-
ster-Innenstadt, Case 8/81, [1982] E.C.R. 53, [1982] 1 C.M.L.R. 499.
28. EEC Treaty, supra note 2, art. 189.
29. Id. art. 171; see infra part I.C (discussing Article 169 proceedings).
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State a general obligation of Community loyalty."0 Article 5
requires Member States to fulfill their Treaty obligations, facil-
itate the achievement of the Community's tasks, and abstain
from any measures likely to undermine the attainment of the
Treaty objectives.3' The obligations under Article 5 depend
on, and may be used in conjunction with, provisions of the
Treaty or secondary legislation. 2
In Commission v. Italy ("Slaughtered Cows"),"3 the Court of
Justice held that a Member State that does not give effect to a
regulation has failed to fulfill the obligations that it has as-
sumed by virtue of its adherence to the EEC Treaty. 4 In
Slaughtered Cows, Italy failed to give effect to a Community reg-
ulation creating a system of premiums for slaughtering cows in
order to control milk production. 5 The Court stated that reg-
ulations come into force solely by virtue of their publication in
the Official Journal of the European Communities, and at that
moment are immediately and entirely binding on all Member
States.3 6 Thus, the Court continued, Member States must re-
spect Community rules in order to profit from the advantages
30. EEC Treaty, supra note 2, art. 5; see John Temple Lang, Community Constitu-
tional Law: Article 5 EEC Treaty, 27 COMMON MKT. L. REV. 645, 647 (1990). Mr. Tem-
ple Lang states that "Article 5 imposes a positive obligation on Member States to
take all measures, legislative, administrative and judicial, which are necessary to give
full effect to Community law." Id.
31. EEC Treaty, supra note 2, art. 5. Article 5 provides that
Member States shall take all appropriate measures, whether general or par-
ticular, to ensure fulfillment of the obligations arising out of this Treaty or
resulting from action taken by the institutions of the Community. They
shall facilitate the achievement of the Community's tasks.
They shall abstain from any measure which could jeopardise the attain-
ment of the objectives of this Treaty.
Id.
32. See Geddo v. Ente Nazionale Risi, Case 2/73, (1973] E.C.R. 865, 878, [1974]
1 C.M.L.R. 13, 41, (discussing scope of Article 5 when used in conjunction with pro-
visions of regulation and Treaty articles regarding internal tax, imposed on national
products alone, designed to provide funds to aid national production); see also Leclerc
v. Au B16 vert, Case 231/83, [1985] E.C.R. 1, 33, [1985] 2 C.M.L.R. 524, 540 (hold-
ing that Member State's obligations under Article 5, used in conjunction with Articles
3(f) and 85, are not specific enough to preclude Member State from enacting legisla-
tion on competition in retail prices for books provided that other Treaty articles are
satisfied).
33. Case 39/72, [1973] E.C.R. 101, 116, [1973] C.M.L.R. 439, 457.
34. Id. at 116, [1973] C.M.L.R. at 457.
35. Id. at 109, [1973] C.M.L.R. at 452.
36. Id. at 114, [1973] C.M.L.R. at 456; see EEC Treaty, supra note 2, art. 189
(defining regulations and their function).
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of the Community. 7 A Member State that fails to give effect to
a regulation disrupts the equilibrium between the advantages
and obligations of the Community, resulting in discrimination
against individuals. 8 In failing to give effect to a regulation,
the Member State thereby fails to fulfill its obligations under
the Treaty.39
Treaty obligations also can arise from Community meas-
ures that are not directly applicable.4" Because Article 5 im-
poses a positive obligation on each Member State to take all
measures necessary to give full effect to Community law,4' na-
tional authorities must ensure compliance with both Commu-
nity law and national measures that implement Community ob-
ligations.4 2 In addition, national judiciaries must set aside na-
tional rules that prevent Community law from having full force
and effect.4 3 Member States are not free to carry out Commu-
nity law duties in a manner such that the duties will be incom-
37. Slaughtered Cows, [1973] E.C.R. at 116, [1973] C.M.L.R. at 457.
38. Id.
39. Id.
40. See, e.g., Ursula Becker v. Finanzamt Miunster-Innenstadt, Case 8/81, [1982]
E.C.R. 53, 70, [1982] 1 C.M.L.R. 499, 512 (holding that Member State may not rely
on its own failure to perform obligations that harmonization of value added taxes
directive requires); Pubblico Ministero v. Ratti, Case 148/78, [1979] E.C.R. 1629,
1641-42, [1980] 1 C.M.L.R. 96, 109-10 (holding that Member State may not apply its
non-compliant national law against person who has complied with directive regard-
ing harmonization of labeling laws for solvents).
41. EEC Treaty, supra note 2, art. 5; Temple Lang, supra note 30, at 647. Article
5 applies to all national authorities, executive, legislative and judicial, to state enter-
prises, to regional and local authorities, and to private bodies to which State powers
have been delegated. Foster v. British Gas plc, Case C-188/89, [1990] E.C.R. , ,
[1990] 2 C.M.L.R. 833, 857.
42. Commission v. Netherlands, Case 96/81, [1982] E.C.R. 1791, 1803-04,
[ 1981-1983 Transfer Binder] Common Mkt. Rep. (CCH) 8841, at 7949 (discussing
national laws and need for modification in context of Community directive on quality
of bathing water); Openbaar Ministerie v. Bout, Case 21/81, [1982] E.C.R. 381, 389,
[1982] 2 C.M.L.R. 371, 380 (restricting Member State's powers to formulate fishery
conservation policy after Community measures have been taken); see Procureur de la
R~publique and Comit6 National de Defense contre I'Alcoolisme v. Alex Waterkeyn,
Joined Cases 314-16/81 & 83/82, [1982] E.C.R. 4337, 4360-61, [1983] 2 C.M.L.R.
145, 164 (discussing binding nature of Article 171 after Article 169 judgment with
regard to French breach of Article 30 of Treaty by regulating advertising of alcoholic
beverages in discriminatory manner).
43. Regina v. Secretary of State for Transport, ex parte Factortame Ltd., Case C-
213/89, [1990] E.C.R. 2433, [1990] 3 C.M.L.R. 1, 29; Amministrazione Delle Finanze
Dello Stato v. Simmenthal S.p.A., Case 106/77, [1978] E.C.R. 629, 643, [1978] 3
C.M.L.R. 263, 282-83; Internationale Handelsgesellshaft mbH v. Einfuhr-und Vor-
ratsstelle ftir Getreide und Futtermittel, Case 11/70, [1970] E.C.R. 1125, 1134,
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pletely or ineffectively applied by national courts. 44 This obli-
gation to give full effect to Community law requires that na-
tional courts enforce rules that are not directly applicable
within the Member State.45 Moreover, where possible, each
national court must interpret its national laws such that they
remain within the wording and purpose of the applicable Com-
munity law.46
B. The Court ofJustice's Protection of Community Rights
In Van Gend en Loos v. Nederlandse Administratie der Belast-
ingen,47 the Court ofJustice established the "direct effect" doc-
trine by holding that a Treaty article can confer rights upon
which individuals and undertakings may rely before their na-
tional courts.48 For a Treaty article to have "direct effect," it
must be unconditional, sufficiently precise, and not require
further implementation by the Member State.49 When these
requirements are fulfilled, the article in question will possess
[1972] C.M.L.R. 255, 283; Costa v. ENEL, Case 6/64, 1964 E.C.R. 585, 593-94,
[1964] C.M.L.R. 425, 455.
44. Harz v. Deutsch Tradax GmbH, Case 79/83, [1984] E.C.R. 1921, 1942-43,
[1986] 2 C.M.L.R. 430, 453-54 (examining implementation requirements of equal
treatment of men and women directive); Von Colson and Kamann v. Land
Nordrhein-Westfalen, Case 14/83, [1984] E.C.R. 1891, 1906-09, [1986] 2 C.M.L.R.
430, 451-53 (examining implementation requirements of Directive 76/207 on equal
treatment of men and women and concluding that directive does not confer on fe-
male applicant right to contract of employment with discriminating employer).
45. Ursula Becker v. Finanzamt Miunster-Innenstadt, Case 8/81, [1982] E.C.R.
53, 70, [1982] 1 C.M.L.R. 499, 512; Pubblico Ministero v. Ratti, Case 148/78, [1979]
E.C.R. 1629, 1641-42, [1980] 1 C.M.L.R. 96, 109-10.
46. Murphy v. Bord Telecom Eireann, Case 157/86, [1988] E.C.R. 673, 690,
[1988] 1 C.M.L.R. 879, 886; Von Colson, [1984] E.C.R. at 1909, [1986] 2 C.M.L.R. at
453-54. The Court in Von Colson stated that "[i]t is for the national court to interpret
and apply the legislation adopted for the implementation of the directive in conform-
ity with the requirements of Community law, in so far as it is given discretion to do so
under national law." Id. The Court in Murphy was interpreting Directive 75/117 on
equal pay for men and women concerning female workers receiving less pay for work
of higher value. Murphy, [1988] E.C.R. 673, [1988] 1 C.M.L.R. 879. The Court fur-
ther elucidated that "[i]t is for the national court, within the limits of its discretion
under national law, when interpreting and applying domestic law, to give to it, where
possible, an interpretation which accords with the requirements of the applicable
Community law and, to the extent that this is not possible, to hold such domestic law
inapplicable." Id. at 690, [1986] 2 C.M.L.R. at 886.
47. Case 26/62, [1963] E.C.R. 1, [1963] C.M.L.R. 105.
48. Id. at 12, [1963] C.M.L.R. at 129. The Court in Van Genden Loos held Treaty
Article 12 to have a direct effect. Id. at 12-13.
49. Id. at 13.
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an "internal effect" within the Member State and will be "di-
rectly applicable."5
The Court in Van Gend en Loos concluded that the direct
effect of Treaty provisions arises because of the particular legal
nature of the EEC Treaty.5 ' The Court stated that the Com-
munity constitutes a "new legal order" of international law
that not only imposes obligations on individuals but also con-
fers rights that become part of the individuals' legal heritage.52
These rights arise not only where expressly granted by the
Treaty but also on the basis of obligations that the Treaty im-
poses.53
National courts are obliged under Community law to pro-
tect rights that Member State citizens derive from the direct
effect of the provisions of Community law. 54 Thus, the domes-
tic legal system must establish courts having jurisdiction and
50. Andrew Durand, Enforceable Community Rights and National Remedies, 1987
DENNING L.J. 43, 48.
51. Van Gend en Loos, [1963] E.C.R. at 12, [1963] C.M.L.R. at 129.
52. Id.; see Costa v. ENEL, Case 6/64, [1964] E.C.R. 585, 593, [1964] C.M.L.R.
425, 455.
53. Van Gend en Loos v. Nederlandse Administratie der Belastingen, Case 106/
77, [1963] E.C.R. 1, 12, [1963] C.M.L.R. 105, 129; see Deirdre Curtin, The Province of
Government: Delimiting the Direct Effect of Directives in the Common Lzw Context, 15 EUR. L.
REV. 195, 197 (1990). Ms. Curtin noted that
[i]nstead of the hitherto recognised position that provisions of directives can
be directly effective in their own right, direct effect was envisaged more or
less as a 'side-effect' or 'reflex' occasioned by the failure on the part of a
Member State to implement its Treaty obligations by correctly implement-
ing the directive in question. According to this approach, a directive does
not directly confer rights upon individuals; these arise only indirectly out of
the obligations imposed upon Member States.
Id.
54. Rewe-Zentralfinanz eG and Rewe-Zentral AG v. Landwirtschaftskammer fiir
das Saarland, Case 33/76, [1976] E.C.R. 1989, 1997-98, [1977] 1 C.M.L.R. 533, 550
(rendering decision in regards to Treaty article and a regulation); see Temple Lang,
supra note 30, at 651 (interpreting Court's holding in Nordsee Deutsche Hochseefis-
cherei, Case 102/81, [1982] E.C.R. 110, 111, [1981-1983 Transfer Binder] Common
Mkt. Rep. (CCH) 8821, at 7734); see also Commission v. Italy, Case 48/71, [1972]
E.C.R. 527, 532, [1972] C.M.L.R. 699, 708 [hereinafter Second Art Treasures]. In
Second Art Treasures, the Court reviewed an action brought by the Commission for
Italy's failure to comply with a judgment of the Court. Id. The Court stated that
Community law, declared as resjudicata in respect of the Italian Republic, is a
prohibition having the full force of law on the competent national authori-
ties against applying a national rule recognized as incompatible with the
Treaty and, if the circumstances so require, an obligation on them to take all
appropriate measures to enable Community law to be fully applied.
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the procedures needed to protect these rights. 55 These courts
must ensure that the rights are fully protected.56 Community
law requires that national courts set aside any provision of na-
tional law that conflicts with Community law, regardless of
whether it is adopted prior or subsequent to the Community
rule.5 1 Community law also directly requires that national ju-
diciaries ensure effective judicial protection of rights conferred
by Community law, even if the analogous necessary powers do
not exist in national law. 58  These powers include protecting
the rights of individuals against public authorities and other
bodies that, pursuant to state measures, are responsible for
providing public services.59 Individuals may seek, for example,
the repayment of taxes imposed by a valid national law that
conflicts with Community law.6°
55. Rewe, [1976] E.C.R. at 1997-98, [1977] 1 C.M.L.R. at 550.
56. Bozzetti v. Invernizzi SpA, [1985] E.C.R. 2301, 2317-18, [1986] 2 C.M.L.R.
246, 262 (involving regulations on milk and milk products).
57. Amministrazione delle Finanze dello Stato v. Simmenthal S.p.A., Case 106/
77, [1978] E.C.R. 629, [1978] 3 C.M.L.R. 263 (interpreting Treaty articles); Costa v.
ENEL, Case 6/64, [1964] E.C.R. 585, [1964] C.M.L.R. 425 (interpreting Treaty arti-
cles). In Simmenthal, the Court stated that
[any provision of a national legal system and any legislative, administrative
or judicial practice which might impair the effectiveness of Community law
by withholding from the national court having jurisdiction to apply such law
the power to do everything necessary at the moment of its application to set
aside national legislative provisions which might prevent Community rules
from having full force and effect are incompatible with those requirements
which are the very essence of Community law.
Simmenthal, [1978] E.C.R. at 644, [1978] 2 C.M.L.R. at 283.
58. Regina v. Secretary of State for Transport, ex parte Factortame Ltd., Case C-
213/89, [1990] E.C.R. 2433, 2473-74, [1990] 3 C.M.L.R. 1, 29 (interpreting Treaty
articles). In Factortame, the Court reiterated its holding in Simmenthal that any na-
tional legal or judicial practice that might hinder the effectiveness of Community law
by withholding from a national court the "power to do everything necessary" forth-
with to set aside any conflicting national law is itself incompatible with Community
law. Factortame, [1990] E.C.R. at 2473-74, [1990] 3 C.M.L.R. at 29; see Simmenthal,
[1978] E.C.R. at 644, [1978] 3 C.M.L.R. at 283.
59. Foster v. British Gas plc, Case C-188/89, [1990] E.C.R. -, [1990] 2
C.M.L.R. 833. In Foster, the Court stated that
[a] body, whatever its legal form, which has been made responsible, pursu-
ant to a measure adopted by the State, for providing a public service under
the control of the State and has for that purpose special powers beyond
those which result from the normal rules applicable in relations between
individuals is included in any event among the bodies against which the pro-
visions of a directive capable of having direct effects may be relied upon.
Id. at -, [1990] 2 C.M.L.R. at 857.
60. See e.g., Amministrazione delle Finanze dello Stato v. San Giorgio, Case 199/
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Following reasoning similar to that employed in Van Gend
en Loos, the Court of Justice subsequently expanded the direct
effect doctrine to apply to situations involving unimplemented
or improperly implemented directives for which the prescribed
implementation period has expired.6 ' For a directive to have
direct effect, the provisions of the directive must be uncondi-
tional, sufficiently precise, and define rights that the individu-
als can assert against the Member State.62 The Court based
this holding on the premise that a Member State may not rely,
as against individuals, on its own failure to perform the obliga-
tions that the directive entails. 63 This doctrine became known
as "vertical direct effect" because the provision may only be
relied on against the Member State.' The Court, however,
has not allowed a private individual to invoke a directive
against another private individual, which has become known as
82, [1983] E.C.R. 3595, 3612, [1985] 2 C.M.L.R. 658, 690; Rewe-Zentralfinanz eG
and Rewe-Zentral AG v. Landwirtschaftskammer fuir das Saarland, Case 33/76,
[1976] E.C.R. 1989, 1997-98, [1977] 1 C.M.L.R. 533; Comet BV v. Produktschapvoor
Siergewassen, Case 45/76, [1976] E.C.R. 2043, [1977] 1 C.M.L.R. 533.
The application of Article 5 has limits. The Commission could not use it, for
example, to create new obligations for the Member States such as to adopt specific
measures, absent a Treaty provision or institutional act. Brother Industries v. Com-
mission, Case 229/86, [1987] E.C.R. 3757, 3763.
61. Ursula Becker v. Finanzamt Muinster-Innenstadt, Case 8/81, [1982] E.C.R.
53, 71, [1982] 1 C.M.L.R. 499, 512-513; Pubblico Ministero v. Tullio Ratti, Case
148/78, [1979] E.C.R. 1629, [1980] 1 C.M.L.R. 96. Van Duyn v. Home Office, Case
41/74, [1974] E.C.R. 1337, 1348, [1975] 1 C.M.L.R. 1, 15-16. In Van Duyn, the Court
held that
it would be incompatible with the binding effect attributed to a directive by
Article 189 to exclude, in principle, the possibility that the obligation which
it imposes may be invoked by those concerned. In particular, where the
Community authorities have, by directive, imposed on Member States the
obligation to pursue a particular course of conduct, the useful effect of such
an act would be weakened if individuals were prevented from relying on it
before their national courts and the latter were prevented from taking it into
consideration as an element of Community law.
[1974] E.C.R. at 1348, [1975] 1 C.M.L.R. at 16. The rationale the Court used was
subsequently shifted in Ratti and Becker. Sacha Prechal, Remedies After Marshall, 27
COMMON MKT. L. REV. 451, 453 (1990). In Becker, the Court stated that "a Member
State which has not adopted the implementing measures required by the directive
within the prescribed period may not plead, as against individuals, its own failure to
perform the obligations which the directive entails." [1982] E.C.R. at 71, [1982]
C.M.L.R. at 512.
62. Becker, [1982] E.C.R. at 71, [1982] 1 C.M.L.R. at 512-13.
63. Id. at 71, [1982] 1 C.M.L.R. at 512.
64. See Prechal, supra note 61, at 451.
1991-1992] IMPLEMENTING EEC DIRECTIVES 1247
"horizontal direct effect." 65
The Court of Justice has also required national courts to
interpret national legislation in a manner consistent with the
provisions of the directive in question.66 The Court appears to
be urging national courts to interpret national law in a manner
such as to give directives "maximum effect." '67 When a direc-
tive cannot confer a direct effect and national law cannot be
construed to give the directive its intended effect, the only re-
course for an individual or undertaking is to request that the
Commission institute an Article 169 proceeding. 68
C. Article 169 Proceedings
The Commission may, at its discretion, institute a pro-
ceeding under Article 169 against a Member State when the
Commission considers that the Member State failed to fulfill its
obligations under the EEC Treaty.69 Proceedings are initiated
65. Marshall v. Southampton and South West Hampshire Area Health Author-
ity, Case 152/84, [1986] E.C.R. 723.
66. Dorit Harz v. Deutsche Tradax GmbH, Case 79/83, [1984] E.C.R. 1921,
1942-43, [1986] 2 C.M.L.R. 430, 453; Sabine von Colson and Elisabeth Kamann v.
Land Nordrhein-Westfalen, Case 14/83, [1984] E.C.R. 1891, 1909, [1986] 2
C.M.L.R. 430, 453-54.
67. Cf. Curtin, supra note 1, at 221.
68. See infra part I.C (discussing Article 169 proceedings).
69. EEC Treaty, supra note 2, art. 169. Article 169 provides that
[i]f the Commission considers that a Member State has failed to fulfil an
obligation under this Treaty, it shall deliver a reasoned opinion on the mat-
ter after giving the State concerned the opportunity to submit its observa-
tions.
If the State concerned does not comply with the opinion within the pe-
riod laid down by the Commission, the latter may bring the matter before
the Court of Justice.
Id.
The Commission has discretion in bringing Article 169 actions, and since 1977
has prosecuted infringements more vigorously than in the past. See A.C. Evans, The
Enforcement Procedure of Article 169: Commission Discretion, 4 EuR. L. REV. 442 (1979)
(discussing EEC Commission's discretion); Ulrich Everling, The Member States of the
European Community Before Their Court ofjustice, 9 EUR. L. REV. 215 (1984) (discussing
frequency of infringement prosecution). Mr. Everling notes that "255 actions for
infringement of the Treaties were brought from 1953 to 1983.... They account for
about one-fifth of all direct actions, the total of which moreover-leaving aside cases
brought by officials-corresponds to the preliminary ruling cases .... Of the 255
actions, 139 (i.e. about 55 per cent) were brought in 1981 to 1983 alone." Id. at 219.
Another Member State may also bring a similar action under Article 170. EEC
Treaty, supra note 2, art. 170. One commentator finds that "[c]omplaints from indi-
viduals, companies, trade associations and governments provide the Commission's
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by informal contacts with the Member State in order to try to
remedy the situation without bringing a suit.70 Proceedings
formally begin with the dispatch of a reasoned opinion from
the Commission to the Member State. 7' The reasoned opinion
recounts the subject matter of the dispute and supplies infor-
mation needed for the Member State to prepare a defense.7 2
The Member State may reply to this opinion. 73 If no settle-
ment is forthcoming, the Commission must provide a coherent
statement of the reasons that led it to conclude that the Mem-
ber State has failed to fulfill its obligations under the EEC
Treaty. 4 If the recalcitrant Member State fails to comply with
the Commission opinion within the stipulated time period, the
Commission has the discretion to bring suit against the Mem-
ber State before the Court of Justice.75
When the Court of Justice renders a judgment against a
Member State in an Article 169 proceeding, it is limited to is-
suing a declaration that the Member State has failed to fulfill
an obligation under the Treaty.76 The Court of Justice can
neither impose sanctions nor require the Member State to act
or refrain from acting to eliminate the infringement. 77 Mem-
ber States are bound, however, by Article 171 of the Treaty
that requires each Member State to take the measures neces-
sary to comply with an Article 169 judgment.78 If a Member
main source of information about possible infringements." Dashwood & White,
supra note 3, at 396. "The task of monitoring the transposition of directives into
national law is made easier by the inclusion in the text of a requirement, which is now
standard, that the Member States notify the Commission of the implementing meas-
ures they have taken." Id.
70. Dashwood & White, supra note 3, at 396.
71. Id.
72. See Commission v. Belgium, Case 85/85, [1986] E.C.R. 1149, [1987] 1
C.M.L.R. 787; Commission v. Italy, Case 274/83, [1985] E.C.R. 1077, [1987] 1
C.M.L.R. 345; Commission v. Italy, Case 51/83, [1984] E.C.R. 2793, [1986] 2
C.M.L.R. 274.
73. Dashwood & White, supra note 3, at 397.
74. Commission v. Germany, Case 325/82, [1984] E.C.R. 777, 793, [1985] 2
C.M.L.R. 719, 750; Commission v. Italy, Case 7/61, [1961] E.C.R. 317, 327, [1962]
C.M.L.R. 39, 54 [hereinafter Pork Products].
75. Pork Products, [1961] E.C.R. 317, [1962] C.M.L.R. 39; see Dashwood & White,
supra note 3, at 396-98 (discussing procedure of Article 169 suits).
76. Dashwood & White, supra note 3, at 405. Only six out of every hundred
recorded infringements reaches the state of ajudgment by the Court ofJustice. Id. at
411.
77. Id. at 405-06.
78. EEC Treaty, supra note 2, art. 171. Article 171 states that "[i]f the Court of
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State refuses to comply with the judgment, the Commission's
only legal recourse is to bring another Article 169 proceeding
for the Member State's infringement of Article 171.9
D. The Availability of Damages for Breach of Community Law by a
Member State
1. Recognition of Liability Under Community Law for
Breaches of Community Law
Commentators have argued that the Court of Justice has
recognized a right to compensation for a loss suffered as a re-
sult of breach of Community law.80 The Court has consistently
stressed that national courts must ensure the legal protection
that citizens derive from the direct effect of the provisions of
Community law.8' The Court of Justice has stated further that
Justice finds that a Member State has failed to fulfil an obligation under this Treaty,
the State shall be required to take the necessary measures to comply with the judg-
ment of the Court of Justice." Id.; see Procureur de la R6publique and Comit6 Na-
tional de D6fense contre I'Alcoolisme v. Alex Waterkeyn, Joined Cases 314-16/81 &
83/82, [1982] E.C.R. 4337, 4361, [19831 2 C.M.L.R. 145, 164; see also Commission v.
Italy, Case 69/86, [1987] E.C.R. 773, [1986-1988 Transfer Binder] Common Mkt
Rep. (CCH) 14,425, at 17,987; Commission v. Italy, Case 160/85, [1986] E.C.R.
3245, [1986-1988 Transfer Binder] Common Mkt Rep. (CCH) 14,399, at 17,680;
Commission v. Italy, Case 131/84, [1985] E.C.R. 3531, [1986] C.M.L.R. 693.
79. Dashwood & White, supra note 3, at 406-07.
80. See, e.g., Curtin, supra note 1, at 732; Green & Barav, supra note 9, at 61. Drs.
Green and Barav observed that "[lI]egal writers have deduced a right to compensa-
tion for breach of Community law from the very definition of direct applicability.
Judicial authorities on this matter are, however, scant and the only direct pronounce-
ment on this point by the European Court is to be found in Russo v. AIMA. This case
could be regarded as establishing the right to compensation for a loss suffered as a
result of breach of Community law." Id. (citing Carmine Antonio Russo v. Azienda di
Stato per gli Interventi sul Mercato Agricolo (AIMA), Case 60/75, [1976] E.C.R. 45,
[1976 Transfer Binder] Common Mkt. Rep. (CCH) 8338). Ms. Curtin also noted
that "[t]he proposition that damages should be awarded under national law to those
individuals who suffer loss as a result of a Member State's breach of Community law
received some support in Russo v. ALMA." Curtin, supra note 1, at 732 (citing Russo,
[1976] E.C.R. 45, [1976 Transfer Binder] Common Mkt. Rep. (CCH) 8338).
81. See, e.g., Rewe-Zentralfinanz eG and Rewe-Zentral AG v. Landwirtschaft-
skammer f'ir das Saarland, Case 33/76, [1976] E.C.R. 1989, 1997-98, [1977] 1
C.M.L.R. 533, 550-51. In Rewe, the Court stated that
in the absence of Community rules on this subject, it is for the domestic
legal system of each Member State to designate the courts having jurisdic-
tion and to determine the procedural conditions governing actions at law
intended to ensure the protection of the rights which citizens have from the
direct effect of Community law, it being understood that such conditions
cannot be less favorable than those relating to similar actions of a domestic
nature.
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a Member State is liable for damages caused by an infringe-
ment of directly applicable Community law when the Member
State would be liable under a national law that is comparable
to the Community provision at issue.82 The Court has also de-
clared that the direct effect of a provision of Community law
"may be relied upon" when suing the Member State for dam-
ages in a national court.8 3
The provisions of Community law having direct effect cre-
ate enforceable Community rights for individuals and under-
takings, whereas an Article 169 proceeding does not. 4 The
rights that are for the benefit of individuals flow from directly
effective provisions of Community law, not from an Article 169
judgment.8 5 The Court ofJustice stated that the purpose of an
Article 169 judgment is to lay down the duties of the Member
State when the Member State fails to fulfill its Treaty obliga-
tions.8 6 The national courts are not permitted, therefore, to
condition the availability of remedies for breaches of Commu-
nity rights upon a prior judgment by the Court. 7 The Court
Id. at 1997-98, [1977] 1 C.M.L.R. at 550-51.
82. Russo, [1976] E.C.R. at 56, [1976 Transfer Binder] Common Mkt. Rep.
(CCH) at 7169. The Court in Russo stated that
[i]t is for the national court to decide on the basis of the facts of each case
whether an individual producer has suffered such damage. If such damage
has been caused through an infringement of Community law the State is
liable to the injured party of the consequences in the context of the provi-
sions of national law on the liability of the State.
Id. at 56, [1976 Transfer Binder] Common Mkt. Rep. (CCH) at 7169; see Granaria Bv
v. Hoofdproduktschap Voor Akkerbouwprodukten, Case 101/78, [1979] E.C.R. 623,
[1979] 3 C.M.L.R. 124; Jean-E. Humblet v. Belgium, Case 6/60, [1960] E.C.R. 559,
569 (deciding case in context of European Coal and Steel Community, one of three
Treaties comprising European Community).
83. Foster v. British Gas plc, Case C-188/89, [1990] E.C.R. -, [1990] 2
C.M.L.R. 833. The Court in Foster concentrated upon whether or not Directive 76/
207 on the equal treatment of men and women could be relied on against British Gas
Corporation. The Court made no reference to a remedy in damages for a violation
of directly effective Community law. See id. In the preliminary ruling, however, the
Court stated that the directive "may be relied upon in a claim for damages against a
body, whatever its legal form, which has been made responsible, pursuant to a mea-
sure adopted by the State, for providing a public service under the control of the
State." Id. at -, [1990] 2 C.M.L.R. at 858.
84. Procureur de la R~publique and Comit6 National de Defense contre
'Alcoolisme v. Alex Waterkeyn, Joined Cases 314-16/81 & 83/82, [1982] E.C.R.
4337, 4361, [1983] 2 C.M.L.R. 145, 164.
85. Id.
86. Id.
87. See Curtin, supra note 1, at 731.
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has stated, however, that a finding against a Member State in
an Article 169 proceeding may establish "the basis of liability"
of the Member State for individuals.88
The courts and tribunals of the Member States are respon-
sible for the administration and enforcement of Community
law. 89 Individuals adversely affected by violations of Commu-
nity law have recourse in their own courts and tribunals, except
in those cases in which the Court of Justice has exclusive juris-
diction.90 When a question of Community law arises before a
national court or tribunal, Article 177 allows the national court
or tribunal to request a preliminary ruling from the Court of
Justice if the national court or tribunal considers that its judg-
ment depends on such a preliminary decision.9 The Court of
Justice has employed Article 177 references from national
88. Commission v. Italy, Case 154/85, [1987] E.C.R. 2717, 2737, [1988] 2
C.M.L.R. 951, 958; Commission v. Italy, Case 309/84, [19861 E.C.R. 599, [1987] 2
C.M.L.R. 657 (deciding Article 169 action for delaying payment of premiums for
abandonment of areas under vines); Slaughtered Cows, Case 39/72, [1973] E.C.R.
101, [1973] C.M.L.R. 439 (considering Article 169 action for failing to implement
regulation concerning premiums for slaughtering cows). In deciding an Article 169
action against Italy regarding the hindering of parallel imports of motor vehicles
from other Member States, the Court in Commission v. Italy held that
the object of an action under Article 169 is established by the Commission's
reasoned opinion, and even when the default has been remedied after the
time-limit prescribed by paragraph 2 of the same article, pursuit of the ac-
tion has an object. That object may consist in particular in establishing the
basis of liability that a Member State could incur towards those who acquire
rights as a result of its default.
[1987] E.C.R. at 2737, [1988] 2 C.M.L.R. at 958.
89. EEC Treaty, supra note 2, art. 177; Rewe-Zentralfinanz eG and Rewe-Zentral
AG v. Landwirtschaftskammer ftir das Saarland, Case 33/76, [1976] E.C.R. 1989,
1997, [1977] 1 C.M.L.R. 533, 550-551; see Green & Barav, supra note 9, at 56.
90. Rewe, [1976] E.C.R. 1989, 1997, [1977] 1 C.M.L.R. 533, 550-51; see Green &
Barav, supra note 9, at 57. The Court ofJustice has exclusive jurisdiction to review the
validity of acts of the Commission and the Council under Article 173 and jurisdiction
to give preliminary rulings under Article 177. EEC Treaty, supra note 2, arts. 173,
177.
91. EEC Treaty, supra note 2, art. 177. Article 177 states that
[t]he Court ofJustice shall have jurisdiction to give preliminary rulings con-
cerning:
(a) the interpretation of this Treaty;
(b) the validity and interpretation of acts of the institutions of the Com-
munity;
(c) the interpretation of the statutes of bodies established by an act of
the Council, where those statutes so provide.
Where such a question is raised before a court or tribunal of a Member
State, that court or tribunal may, if it considers that a decision on the ques-
1252 FORDHAMINTERNATIONAL LA WJOURNAL [Vol. 15:1237
courts to expand the rights of individuals under Community
law. 92 The procedures and rules that apply in enforcing Com-
munity provisions, however, must be comparable to those pro-
cedures and rules that would apply for a similar national law.93
National legal sanctions for the infringement of Community
law must have a "real deterrent effect" and must be "such as to
guarantee full and effective judicial protection." '94
2. Member State Recognition of Liability for Breaches of
Community Law
Each of the Member States acknowledges the principle
that the State is liable under national law for the unlawful acts
of a public authority, provided that the damage was caused by
the public authority in the exercise of its functions. 95 A major-
ity of the national legal rules of the Member States require
proof of fault by a public authority to establish the liability of
the state.96 In the remaining Member States, an illegal act by
tion is necessary to enable it to give judgment, request the Court ofJustice
to give a ruling thereon.
Where any such question is raised in a case pending before a court or
tribunal of a Member State, agaist whose decision there is no judicial rem-
edy under national law, that court or tribunal shall bring the matter before
the Court ofJustice.
Id.
92. See, e.g., Ursula Becker v. Finanzamt Miunster-Innenstadt, Case 8/81, [1982]
E.C.R. 53, [1982] 1 C.M.L.R. 499; Van Gend en Loos v. Nederlandse Administratie
der Belastingen, Case 26/62, [1963] E.C.R. 1, [1963] C.M.L.R. 105.
93. Rewe Handelsgesellschaft Nord mbH & Rewe-Markt Steffen v. Hauptzol-
lampt Kiel, Case 158/80, [1981] E.C.R. 1805, [1982] 1 C.M.L.R. 449 [hereinafter
Butter Buying Cruises]. In Butter Buying Cruises, passengers on cruise ships had the
opportunity to buy goods without tax, thereby distorting competition. Id. The Court
held that
the system of legal protection established by the Treaty, as set out in Article
177 in particular, implies that it must be possible for every type of action
provided for by national law to be available for the purpose of ensuring
observance of Community provisions having direct effect, on the same con-
ditions concerning the admissibility and procedure as would apply were it a
question of ensuring observance of national law.
id. at 1838, [1982] 1 C.M.L.R. at 483.
94. Harz v. Deutsch Tradax GmbH, Case 79/83, [1984] E.C.R. 1921, 1941,
[1986] 2 C.M.L.R. 430, 452; seeJosephine Steiner, How to Make the Action Suit the Case:
Domestic Remedies for Breach of EEC Law, 12 EuR. L. REV. 102, 103 (1987).
95. Curtin, supra note 1, at 732; see, e.g., Bourgoin SA v. Ministry of Agriculture,
Fisheries and Food, [1986] 1 Q.B. 716 (C.A.).
96. See Curtin, supra note 1, at 733. These countries are Denmark, Germany,
Ireland, Luxembourg, the Netherlands, Portugal and the United Kingdom. Id at 733
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an authority is virtually equivalent to a fault.9 7 An illegal act is
an act contrary to the law or a violation of a superior rule of
law while a fault is generally defined as the failure to fulfill a
duty owed to another.98
The United Kingdom provides an example of a Member
State that conditions the liability of the state upon a demon-
stration of fault by a public authority.99 A major difficulty
posed by the integration of EEC law into the domestic frame-
work of the United Kingdom has been the proper selection of a
means of recourse for the plaintiff attempting to bring a Com-
munity law enforcement action. l00 Under U.K. law, a plain-
tiff's choice to proceed by means of private law or public law is
crucial both to the cause of action and remedy.' 0 ' The reme-
dies sought in U.K. courts for breach of directly applicable
Community provisions depend on the correct categorization of
the rights involved which, in itself, is determined by the man-
ner in which the breach occurred. 10 2 Failure to make a correct
selection between private and public law can result in dismissal
of the action.
0 3
A public law action is enforceable only by way of judicial
review.'0 4 When deciding a case under public law, courts may
grant certiorari, mandamus, prohibition, declaration, or an in-
junction. 0 5 The court may also award damages, but this award
n. 112; see, e.g., Pine Valley Developments Ltd. v. The Minister for the Environment,
Ireland and the Attorney General, [1987] I.R. 23; Bourgoin, [1986] 1 Q.B. 716.
97. See Curtin, supra note 1, at 733. These countries are Belgium, France and
Luxembourg. Id. at 733 n. 113; see, e.g., Ministre du Commerce ext6rieur v. Soci~t6
Alivar, [1984] L'Actualit6 Juridique-Droit Administratif [AJ.D.A.] 396, reprinted in
1984 Revue Trimestrielle de Droit Europen (R.T.D.E.) 341.
98. MacKenzie Stuart, The "Non-Contractual" Liability of the E.E.C., 12 COMMON
MKT. L. REV. 493, 506 (1975).
99. Curtin, supra note 1, at 733 n.112.
100. H.W.R. WADE, ADMINISTRATIVE LAw 617 (4th ed. 1977). Unless acting
within the scope of their powers, the public authorities are liable in the same manner
as any other person in tort or contract. Id.
101. See Bourgoin SA v. Ministry of Agriculture, Fisheries and Food, [1986] 1
Q.B. 716 (C.A.); see generally WADE, supra note 100, at 617 (discussing remedies under
U.K. law).
102. See Supreme Court Rules, S.I. 1965, Order 53 (stating cases appropriate
for public law actions); Green & Barav, supra note 9, at 96.
103. Green & Barav, supra note 9, at 83.
104. See Supreme Court Rules, S.I. 1965, Order 53 (outlining rules regarding
judicial review).
105. Id. R. 1. Rule 1 states the cases that are appropriate for application for
judicial review. Id. "Certiorari and prohibition are complementary and discretionary
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has several safeguards to protect against frivolous or vexatious
claims.' 0 6 These safeguards include the requirement of actual
permission by the trial court to proceed and an acknowledge-
ment that the remedies provided are at the discretion of the
trial court.'0 7 Conversely, under a private law right, there is no
requirement that the claimant obtain the court's permission to
proceed, and a remedy is not subject to the court's discre-
tion. 0
Under U.K. law, the torts of breach of statutory duty and
misfeasance in public office provide an action in private law for
litigants seeking damages for a breach of Community law.'0 9
The defendant breaches a statutory duty by violating a statute
that created a duty owed to the plaintiff.it° The breach must
cause the plaintiffs' damages and the damages must be of a
type that the statute was intended to prevent."' The tort of
misfeasance in public office involves proof of the improper
remedies .... WADE, supra note 100, at 525. "Certiorari issues to quash a decision
which is ultra vires or vitiated by error on the face of the record. Prohibition issues to
forbid some act or decision which would be ultra vires." Id. Mandamus provides a
"means of enforcing the performance of public duties by public authorities of all
kinds." Id. at 597. "Certiorari and prohibition deal with wrongful action, [whereas]
mandamus deals with wrongful inaction." Id. A declaratory judgment "states the
rights or legal position of the parties as they stand, without changing them in any
way." Id. at 499. An injunction forbids some "unlawful act." Id. at 490.
106. Supreme Court Rules, S.I. 1965, Order 53, R. 7. Rule 7 states that
(1) On an application for judicial review the Court may, subject to para-
graph (2), award damages to the applicant if-
(a) he has included in the statement in support of his application for
leave under rule 3 a claim for damages arising from any matter to which the
application relates, and
(b) the Court is satisfied that, if the claim had been made in an action
begun by the applicant at the time of making his application, he could have
been awarded damages.
(2) Order 18, rule 12, shall apply to a statement relating to a claim for dam-
ages as it applies to a pleading.
Id.
107. Id. R. 3(1). Rule 3(1) states that "[n]o application for judicial review shall
be made unless the leave of the Court has been obtained in accordance with this
rule." Id.
108. See id.
109. See Bourgoin SA v. Ministry of Agriculture, Fisheries and Food, [1986] 1
QB. 716 (C.A.); Green and Barav, supra note 9, at 112.
110. See Garden Cottage Foods v. Milk Marketing Bd., [1983] All E.R. 770;
W.V.H. ROGERS, WINFIELD AND JOLOWICZ ON TORT 160-162 (11 th ed. 1979).
111. ROGERS, supra note 110, at 160-62
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performance of a lawful act. 1 2 The tort of misfeasance re-
quires proof that the offending party acted either with malice
or knowledge of the invalidity of the act in question.'
The dicta of several U.K. decisions indicate that violations
of Community law give rise to a cause of action in private
law."' In Bourgoin SA v. Ministry of Agriculture, Fisheries and
Food,' however, the Court of Appeal held that a breach of
Article 30 of the Treaty sounded only in public law." 6 In
Bourgoin, the plaintiffs were a group of French turkey produ-
cers, exporting to the United Kingdom, who suffered a loss as
a result of an embargo on imports introduced by the U.K. Min-
istry of Agriculture.' ' 7 The embargo prompted the Commis-
sion to bring an Article 169 action in which the Court ofJustice
found the embargo to be a breach of Article 30 of the
Treaty. 118
The plaintiffs subsequently brought suit alleging that the
embargo constituted, among other things, breach of statutory
duty and misfeasance in public office.' 9 The issue raised in
112. WADE, supra note 100, at 636.
113. Green & Barav, supra note 9, at 109; see Bourgoin, [1986] 1 Q.B. at 740
(Mann J. in trial court) (describing malice and knowledge as alternatives with no sen-
sible distinction).
114. In Garden Cottage Foods, on appeal to the House of Lords, against an interim
injunction, Lord Diplock expressed the view that a violation of the directly applicable
Article 86 by a body such as the Milk Marketing Board gave rise to an action in pri-
vate law, sounding in damages, for breach of statutory duty. [1984] 1 App. Cas. 130,
144. In An Bord Bainne Co-operative Ltd v. Milk Marketing Bd., Justice Neill of the High
Court stated in dictum concerning Garden Cottage Foods, [1984] 1 App. Cas. 130, that
although the House of Lords did not give afinal decision that a breach of
Article 86 gives an individual a cause of action in English law, the speeches
provide compelling support for the proposition that contraventions of EEC
regulations which have 'direct effects' create direct rights in private law
which the national courts must protect.
[1984] 1 C.M.L.R. 519, 528 (Eng. High Ct.), aff'd, [1984] 2 C.M.L.R. 584 (Eng. C.A.).
115. [1986] 1 QB. 716 (C.A.).
116. Id. at 787.
117. Id. at 749-50.
118. Commission v. United Kingdom, Case 40/82, [1982] E.C.R. 2793, [1982] 3
C.M.L.R. 497. Article 30 of the Treaty prohibits quantitative restrictions on imports.
EEC Treaty, supra note 2, art. 30.
119. Bourgoin, [1986] 1 QB. at 751. The plaintiffs in Bourgoin argued that Article
30 has direct effect in Community law and creates rights in individuals which must be
protected under domestic law. Id. at 752. The plaintiffs continued by stating that
Article 30 is a statutory duty by virtue of section 2(I) of the European Communities
Act 1972 and thus an action for breach of that duty lies for an individual who suffers
damage as a result of the breach. Id. In rejecting the plaintiffs' argument, the Court
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the Court of Appeal was whether the rights conferred by Arti-
cle 30 were enforceable in private law or in public law.' 20 The
Court of Appeal concluded that although Article 30 was capa-
ble of giving rise to rights in both private and public law, a
breach of Article 30 by a Member State sounded only in public
law.' 2 1 The appropriate remedy, according to the Court, was
judicial review of the acts alleged to be in breach of Article
30.122 A breach of Article 30, then, does not give rise to an
action for damages for breach of statutory duty. 123 The Court
disagreed with the argument emphasized by the dissent that a
breach of Article 30 giving rise to a right only in public law was
inconsistent with the principle of direct effect, which creates
rights that national courts must protect. 24
The enforcement of Community law in national courts is
subject to the various legal and procedural rules existing
within the Member States. 2 5 Determining the correct national
of Appeal noted that "[s]o far as Community law is concerned there is nothing in the
decisions of the European Court which positively or specifically requires that for a
breach by a member state of article 30, a remedy in damages must be available to an
individual who suffers damage by the breach." Id. at 780.
120. See id.
121. Id. at 787. Leave was granted to the House of Lords but the case was set-
tled so that the Court of Appeal judgment is now final. Durand, supra note 50, at 45.
The Court of Appeal distinguished two prior cases: Garden Cottage Foods Ltd v.
Milk Marketing Bd., [19841 App. Cas. 130, and An Bord Bainne Co-op Ltd v. Milk
Marketing Board, [1984] 1 C.M.L.R. 519 (Eng. High Ct.). The Court of Appeal dis-
tinguished Garden Cottage on the grounds that nothing in the prior holding suggested
that a breach by a Member State of a negative obligation in relation to a law could be
categorized as a breach of.statutory duty giving rise to a cause of action in private
law. Bourgoin SA v. Ministry of Agriculture, Fisheries and Food, [1986] 1 Q.B. 716,
787 (C.A.). The Court of Appeal found the reference to individual rights to be with-
out significance since an individual right can be public or private, and, in the Court's
opinion, Article 30 creates individual rights both in public law and private law. Id.
The Court distinguished An Bord Bainne stating that the plaintiff's claim that the U.K.
government is in breach of an obligation not to impose a measure was "wholly differ-
ent from a claim under Article 86 ..... Id. at 787-88.
It was unanimously agreed that the tort of misfeasance in public office was viable
provided, at the very least, that the Ministry of Agriculture intended to protect the
domestic producer and to damage the plaintiff. See id.
122. Bourgoin, [1986] 1 Q.B. at 787. The leading majority opinion stated that
"[a]n individual right may be a right in private law or public law; article 30 in my
judgment creates individual rights both in public law and private law. A breach sim-
pliciter of the article sounds only in public law. A breach amounting to abuse of
power sounds in private law." Id.
123. Steiner, supra note 94, at 107.
124. Bourgoin, [1986] 1 Q.B. at 763.
125. See Rewe-Zentralfinanz eG and Rewe-Zentral AG v. Landwirtschaftskam-
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law under which to enforce Community law is an imprecise art
and, thus, enforcement of Community law can be of questiona-
ble adequacy. 1 6 In Bourgoin, the English Court of Appeal held
that remedies for Community rights arising under Article 30
are public law rights that are subject to the discretion of the
trial court.' 27 Prior to Francovich, the Court of Justice had not
specifically defined the scope of Community rights or the
proper remedies for a breach of those rights, but had left the
determination of procedures and remedies to the national law
as applied in the national courts.12 8
II. FRANCOVICH AND BONIFACI v. ITALY
In Francovich, the Court of Justice considered the rights
and remedies that an individual may claim under an unimple-
mented directive that was incapable of producing a direct ef-
fect.' 29 The plaintiffs sought to hold Italy liable for its failure
to implement a directive. 30 The action was referred under Ar-
ticle 177 to the Court of Justice under the theory that the di-
rective produced direct effect or, in the alternative, that the
Member State was liable because of its failure to implement the
directive.' 3 ' The Court first found that the directive did not
produce direct effect. 132 The Court then held that the unim-
plemented directive created an enforceable Community right
for which damages can be an appropriate remedy. 3 3 Lastly,
the Court asserted that the conditions under which a right to
restitution exists depend on the nature of the violation, and
that it is incumbent upon the Member State to make compen-
mer ftir das Saarland, Case 33/76, [1976] E.C.R. 1989, 1997, [1977] 1 C.M.L.R. 533,
550-51.
126. See Green & Barav, supra note 9, at 83 (discussing choosing between public
and private law actions and the remedies available, for enforcement of Community
law before national courts).
127. Bourgoin SA v. Ministry of Agriculture, Fisheries and Food, [1986] 1 QB.
716, 787 (C.A.); see supra notes 104-108 and accompanying text (discussing remedies
and trial court's discretion).
128. See supra part I.D. 1 (discussing present state of Community law concerning
damages).
129. Andrea Francovich and Danila Bonifaci v. Italy, Joined Cases C-6 & 9/90
(Eur. Ct.J. Nov. 19, 1991) (not yet reported).
130. d. slip op. 7.
131. Id. 7.
132. Id. 27.
133. Id. 35-37.
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sation available to the same extent that compensation would
be available under a similar national law.
134
A. Factual and Procedural Background
In Francovich, Italy failed to implement Directive No. 90/
987 (the "Insolvency Directive")' 35 that harmonizes national
laws concerning the protection of employees in the event that
their employer becomes insolvent. 3 6 The directive requires
that Member States take measures to guaranty the payment of
employees' outstanding claims resulting from contracts of em-
ployment or employment relationships. 37 In fulfilling the re-
quirements of the directive, Member States may choose one of
three dates upon which to begin the guaranty of protection.
38
The Member States may also limit the guarantee institutions'
liability. 3 9 Italy failed to implement the directive within the
allotted period of time.' 40  In response, the Commission
brought an Article 169 proceeding against Italy.' 4 ' In the pro-
ceeding, the Court of Justice declared that Italy had failed to
meet its obligations under the Treaty by failing to implement
the directive by the fixed date.
42
134. Id. 40-42.
135. Council Directive No. 80/987/EEC, O.J. L 283/23 (1980).
136. Andrea Francovich and Danila Bonifaci v. Italy, Joined Cases C-6 & 9/90
(Eur. Ct. J. Nov. 19. 1991) (not yet reported); see Commission v. Italy, Case 22/87,
[1989] E.C.R. 143, 164.
137. Council Directive No. 80/987, art. 1, O.J. L 283/23, (1980). Article 1
states that "[t]his Directive shall apply to employees' claims arising from contracts of
employment or employment relationships and existing against employers who are in
a state of insolvency within the meaning of Article 2(1)." Id.
138. Id. art. 3, Oj. L 283/23, at 24 (1980). Article 3 states that
[a]t the choice of the Member States, the date referred to in paragraph I
shall be:
- either that of the onset of the employer's insolvency;
- or that of the notice of dismissal issued to the employee concerned on
account of the employer's insolvency;
- or that of the onset of the employer's insolvency or that on which the
contract of employment or the employment relationship with the employee
concerned was discontinued on account of the employer's insolvency.
Id.
139. Id. arts. 3, 4, Oj. L 283/23, at 24 (1980). Article 4 states that "Member
States shall have the option to limit the liability of guarantee institutions, referred to
in Article 3." Id. art. 4, O.J. L 283/23, at 24 (1980).
140. Italy, [1989] E.C.R. 143, 164.
141. Id.
142. Id. at 173.
1991-1992] IMPLEMENTING EEC DIRECTIVES 1259
The plaintiffs in Francovich brought suit against the Italian
government to recover their unpaid salaries, basing their claim
on the guarantees foreseen by the Insolvency Directive. 4 '
Faced with questions of Community law, two Italian national
courts referred three similar questions to the Court of Justice
under Article 177.' The first question raised two issues that
the court examined separately. 45 The first issue was whether
the directive defined rights that have direct effect.' 46 The sec-
ond issue was the liability of the Member State for damages
arising from violations of Community law.147 The second and
third questions concerned the guaranties of salary repayment
the State must provide if the directive directly confers rights
upon individuals. 48
143. Andrea Francovich and Danila Bonifaci v. Italy, Joined Cases C-6 & 9/90,
5-6 (Eur. Ct. J. Nov. 19, 1991) (not yet reported). Mr. Francovich, the principle
plaintiff in the lawsuit, had worked for the company C.D.N. Elettronica s.n.c. and
only received sporadic payments of his salary. Since then he brought suit in the
Pretura, which had sentenced the defendant company to the payment of a sum of
about six million Lire. Mr. Francovich could not recover this sum from the company
so he brought suit against the Italian state on the guaranties that were supposed to be
created by Directive No. 80/987, or otherwise, indemnification. Id. slip op. 5.
Ms. Bonifaci and 33 other company workers of Gaia Confezioni s.r.I, declared
bankrupt on April 5, 1985, were creditors for an increasing sum of 253 million Lire,
which had been admitted as a liability of the company. More than five years after the
company declared bankruptcy, the workers still had not received any compensation
due to them. The assignee in bankruptcy had told them that an equal distribution
among them was unlikely. The creditors brought suit against the Italian republic
demanding that the Italian republic pay them money owed in back salary, at least for
the last three months or, otherwise, to pay them indemnification. Id. 6.
144. EEC Treaty, supra note 2, art 177. Article 177 allows national courts to
refer questions to the Court ofJustice when those questions concern matters of inter-
pretation of the Treaty. Id. The Italian courts that referred the questions were the
Pretura of Vicenza (in case 6/90, Francovich) and the Pretura of Bassano del Grappa
(in case 9/90, Bonifaci). Francovich, slip op. 1.
145. Francovich, slip op. 9.
146. Id.
147. Id.
148. Id. 7. The national courts referred the following questions to the Court:
1. By virtue of the Community law in effect, can an individual who has
been damaged by non-execution by the Government of directive 80/987-
non-execution confirmed by judgment of the Court ofJustice--demand per-
formance by this Government of the provisions of said directive, which are
sufficiently precise and unconditional, by citing Community regulations di-
rectly against the defaulting Member State in order to obtain the guaranties
that this State is obliged to provide, and, in any case, request restitution for
the losses suffered as regards provisions that do not enjoy this prerogative?
2. Must the combined provisions of Articles 3 and 4 of directive No.
80/987 of the Council be interpreted as meaning that if the State has not
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B. Judgment of the Court ofJustice
The Court of Justice held Italy liable for the plaintiffs'
damages caused by Italy's failure to implement the Insolvency
Directive within the prescribed period of time. t49 The Court
began by stating that individuals could not rely upon the Insol-
vency Directive on the ground that it had direct effect.'50 In
making this determination, the Court of Justice relied on its
decision in Ursula Becker v. Finanzamt Miinster-Innenstadt,"5" in
which it held that a directive only can have direct effect when
the provisions appear to be "unconditional and sufficiently
precise," and when those provisions "define rights" that indi-
viduals are able to assert against the Member State before the
national courts. 52 In applying this principle, the Court in
Francovich examined the identity of the beneficiaries, the con-
tents of the guaranty, and the identity of the party providing
the guaranty. 53 The Court found that the directive identified
the beneficiaries and, by employing the minimum guaranty
specified by the directive, was unconditional and sufficiently
exercised its power to set the limits specified in Article 4, this State is obli-
gated to pay the charges of the salaried employees to the extent established
by Article 3?
3. In the event of a negative answer to question No. 2, may it please the
Court to establish the minimum guaranty that the State should, by virtue of
Directive No. 80/987, give an entitled worker so that the salary share due
him or her can be deemed performance of the directive itself.
Id. 7 (unofficial translation).
149. Id. 48. The Court ofJustice answered the questions posed to it as follows:
1) The provisions of directive No. 80/987/EEC of the Council, dated
October 20, 1980, concerning the harmonization of the legislations of the
Member States relative to the protection of salaried workers in the event of
the insolvency of the employer that define the workers' rights, must be inter-
preted to mean that the parties cannot enforce these rights against the State
before the national jurisdictions in the absence of application measures im-
plemented within the required time limits;
2) A Member State is obliged to pay restitution for damages arising for
individuals out of the non-transposition of directive No. 80/987/EEC.
Id. (unofficial translation).
150. Id. 27.
151. Case 8/81, [1982] E.C.R. 53, [1982] 1 C.M.L.R. 499; Andrea Francovich
and Danila Bonifaci v. Italy, Joined Cases C-6 & 9/90, slip op. 11 (Eur. Ct. J. Nov.
19, 1991) (affirming Court's holding in Becker).
152. Becker, [1982] E.C.R. 53, [1982] 1 C.M.L.R. 499; see supra notes 47-63 and
accompanying text (discussing direct effect doctrine).
153. Francovich, slip op. 12.
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precise with regard to the content of the guaranty. 154 The
Court held, however, that the provisions of the directive do not
specify the identity of the party that owes the guaranty.' 5 5 The
Court thus held that the Member State cannot be considered
the debtor merely on the ground that it did not implement the
directive within the specified period. 156 Relying on the Becker
standard, the Court concluded that the directive does not have
direct effect.'
57
The Court then rephrased the second part of the first
question to consider Italy's obligation to compensate the
plaintiffs for damages arising as a consequence of Italy's failure
to implement the Insolvency Directive in a timely fashion.'
The Court broadened the question by considering the liability
of Member States for damages arising out of violations of
Community law.' 59 The Court found that the liability for dam-
ages resulting from a violation of obligations under Commu-
nity law arises out of both the general system of the Treaty and
Article 5 of the Treaty. 6 0 The Court relied on the principles it
established in Van Gend en Loos reiterating that the Community
constitutes a new legal order for which the Member States
have limited their sovereign rights, and that "Community law
... not only imposes obligations on individuals but ... con-
fer[s] upon them rights which become part of their legal heri-
tage."'' The Court also relied on Article 5 of the Treaty,
154. Id. 4 20-22. Article 4, paragraph 3 of the directive allows Member States
to establish a ceiling for the payment of guaranty in order to avoid the payment of
sums exceeding the social-welfare purpose of the directive. Council Directive No.
80/987, O.J. L 283/23 (1980). The Court noted that a Member State that has failed
to meet its obligation to transpose a directive cannot frustrate the rights that the
directive creates for the benefit of individuals on the basis of its power to limit the
amount of the guaranty that it could have exercised had it taken the steps necessary
for the implementation of the directive. Francovich, slip op. 21.
155. Id. 26.
156. Id. 26.
157. Id. 27.
158. Id. 28.
159. Id. 29.
160. Id. 35-36. The Court stated that "[t]he possibility of restitution payable
by the Member States is particularly vital when, as in this particular case, the full
effect of Community regulations is conditioned upon action by the State, and when,
consequently, in the absence of such action individuals cannot enforce before the
national jurisdictions the rights recognized as theirs by Community law." Id. 34
(unofficial translation).
161. Andrea Francovich and Danila Bonifaci v. Italy, Joined Cases C-6 & 9/90,
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which requires Member States to take all measures necessary
to ensure performance of obligations imposed by Community
law. 162
The Court further stated that the conditions under which
Community law creates a right to restitution depend on the
nature of the Community law violation in issue. 63 The Court
found that when three conditions are satisfied, individuals have
a right to restitution for a Member State's failure to abide by its
obligation under Article 189.164 First, the result prescribed by
the directive must involve "the granting of rights to individu-
als."' 6 5 Second, the rights must be "identifiable on the basis of
the provisions of the directive."'16 6 Third, a causal link must
exist "between the violation of the obligation incumbent upon
the State and the damage suffered by the injured persons. "167
When these three conditions are satisfied, the Court re-
quires that damages be made available for a breach of Commu-
nity law to the same extent as damages would be available
against a Member State for a similar action under national
law.' 68 The Court held that, absent Community harmoniza-
slip op. 31 (Eur. Ct.J. Nov. 19, 1991); Costa v. ENEL, Case 6/64, [1964] E.C.R.
585, [1964] C.M.L.R. 425; Van Gend en Loos v. Nederlandse Administratie der Be-
lastingen, Case 26/62, [1963] E.C.R. 1, 12, [1963] C.M.L.R. 105, 129.
162. Francovich, slip op. 36. The Court noted that these obligations included
the obligation to eliminate the unlawful consequences of a violation of Community
law. Id; see Jean-E. Humblet v. Belgium, Case 6/60, [1960] E.C.R. 559, 569 (regard-
ing the analogous provision of Article 86 of the ECSC Treaty).
The Advocate General's conclusions were based upon the principle that the non-
transposition of a directive constitutes an ipso facto violation of Articles 5 and 189 of
the Treaty. Opinion of Advocate General Mischo, Francovich, slip op. 68. This
violation is an illegality, equivalent to a fault, so that the Member State must make
reparations for the damages. Id.
163. Francovich, slip op. 38.
164. d. 39.
165. Id. 40 (unofficial translation).
166. Id. (unofficial translation).
167. Id. (unofficial translation).
168. Id. 42. The Court stated that
[slubject to this condition, it is in the context of the national law of liability
that it is incumbent upon the State to make restitution for the consequences
of the prejudice caused. In the absence of Community regulations, it is up
to the internal legal order of each Member State to designate the competent
jurisdictions and to establish the procedural methods of recourse to justice
designed to ensure full safeguarding of the rights that individual subjects
have under Community law ....
Id. (citations omitted) (unofficial translation).
The Advocate General asserted that Community law cannot require the Member
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tion, the internal legal order of each Member State must desig-
nate the courts and methods of recourse and ensure the full
protection of the rights that individuals have under Commu-
nity law. 16 9 In so holding, the Court relied on previous judg-
ments which held that it is incumbent upon national jurisdic-
tions to ensure the full effect of these provisions and to protect
the rights that they confer upon individuals. 70 Basing the
holding on the first question referred, the Court found no
need to rule on the second and third questions. 17 1
C. The Opinion of Advocate General Mischo
In addressing the first question, the Court of Justice gen-
erally followed the opinion of Advocate General Mischo. The
Advocate General, however, provided a more detailed analysis
than did the Court of Justice.' 72 Examining the past judg-
ments of the Court regarding Member States' failure to fulfill
State to formulate remedies for a breach of Community law when similar remedies
do not exist at the national level, although the Treaty does presuppose the existence
of such legal remedies. Opinion of Advocate General Mischo, id. 49.
169. Andrea Francovich and Danila Bonifaci v. Italy, Joined Cases C-6 & 9/90,
slip op. 42 (Eur. Ct. J. Nov. 19, 1991). The Advocate General also suggested that
the grant of damages by a national judge for a Member State's violation of Commu-
nity law should be at least equivalent to the Court's award of damages for a violation
of the same Community law by an institution of the Community. Opinion of Advo-
cate General Mischo, id. 71. The Advocate General stated that this proposition
follows not only from the rules developed by the Court, based on Article 215(2) of
the Treaty, but also from general principles common to all the laws of the Member
States. Id. Support for this proposition was given in Asteris AE v. Greece and Euro-
pean Economic Community, Case 106-20/87, [1988] E.C.R. 5515, [1990] 1 C.M.L.R.
575, where in denying the liability of the Community for an illegal act of one of its
institutions, the Court stated that "an action for damages against the Greek State
would have to be on different grounds from the actions dismissed by the Court." Id.
at 5541, [1990] 1 C.M.L.R. at 590. The Advocate General clarified that a national
judge need not "establish the liability of the State for violations of Community law in
the cases where the Community has no non-contractual liability for a violation of
Community law by one of its institutions." Opinion of Advocate General Mischo,
Francovich, slip op. 72 (unofficial translation). The Advocate General then restated
the circumstances that would engage the liability of the Community and concluded
that the non-transposition or incorrect transposition of a directive satisfies the re-
quirements. Id. 75-77.
170. See Regina v. Secretary of State for Transport, ex parte Factortame Ltd.,
Case C-213/89, [1990] E.C.R. 2433, [1990] 3 C.M.L.R. 1; Amministrazione delle
Finanze dello Stato v. Simmenthal S.p.A., Case 106/77, [1978] E.C.R. 629, [1978] 3
C.M.L.R. 263.
171. Francovich, slip op. 47.
172. See Opinion of Advocate General Mischo, id. 75-77.
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their Treaty obligations, the Advocate General observed that
in cases involving provisions of Community law with direct ef-
fect, private parties derive rights not from the judgment in fail-
ure, but from the directly effective provisions themselves.,7 3
The Court of Justice has stated that an order pursuant to Arti-
cle 169 may be the "basis of liability" of a claim by an individ-
ual against a Member State for its failure.'7 4  The Advocate
General further stressed that although the Court's judgment
that a Member State has failed in its Treaty obligations has
only a declaratory effect, the Member State is still bound by the
obligation incumbent upon it by virtue of Article 171 to exe-
cute the judgment and, therefore, to remedy the damages aris-
ing from its failure. 175  In proposing that Member States are
liable for non-implementation of a directive, even one without
direct effect, the Advocate General stated that an Article 169
adjudication, although not a requirement, confirms the Mem-
173. Id. 64; see Procureur de la R~publique and Comit6 National de Defense
contre I'Alcoolisme v. Alex Waterkeyn, Joined Cases 314-16/81 & 83/82, [1982]
E.C.R. 4337, [1983] 2 C.M.L.R. 145. The Court in Waterkeyn stated that
if the Court finds in proceedings under Articles 169 to 171 of the EEC
Treaty that a Member State's legislation is incompatible with the obligations
which it has under the Treaty the courts of that State are bound by virtue of
Article 171 to draw the necessary inferences from the judgment of the
Court. However, it should be understood that the rights accruing to indi-
viduals derive, not from that judgment, but from the actual provisions of
Community law having direct effect in the internal legal order.
Id. at 4361, [1983] 2 C.M.L.R. at 164.
174. Commission v. Italy, Case 154/85, [1987] E.C.R. 2717, [1988] 2 C.M.L.R.
951; Commission v. Italy, Case 309/84, [1986] E.C.R. 599, [1987] 2 C.M.L.R. 657;
Commission v. Italy, Case 39/72, [1973] E.C.R. 101, [1973] C.M.L.R. 439; see supra
note 88 and accompanying text. The Advocate General stated that because there is a
possibility of incurring liability, the Court might want to indicate that the illegality of
the Member State's conduct alone is not sufficient to engage liability on the part of
the Member State but that other conditions must also be fulfilled. Opinion of Advo-
cate General Mischo, Andrea Francovich and Danila Bonifaci v. Italy, Joined Cases C-
6 & 9/90, slip op. 76 (Eur. Ct.J. Nov. 19, 1991).
175. See Commission v. Germany, Case 70/72, [1973] E.C.R. 813, 829, [1973]
C.M.L.R 741, 764. This conclusion also devolves from the Court's decision inJean-
E. Humblet v. Belgium, Case 6/60, [1960] E.C.R. 559, where the Court emphasized
the declaratory character of its Article 169 judgments in failure and added that
[i]n fact if the Court rules in a judgment that a legislative or administrative
measure adopted by the authorities of a Member State is contrary to Com-
munity law, that Member State is obliged, by virtue of Article 86 of the
ECSC Treaty [which is equivalent to Article 171 of the EEC Treaty], to re-
scind the measure in question and to make reparation for any unlawful con-
sequences which may have ensued.
Id. at 569.
1991-1992] IMPLEMENTING EEC DIRECTIVES
ber State's failure to fulfill its Treaty obligations and its liability
for damages. ' 76
The Advocate General argued that the compensation of
an individual for violations of directly effective Community law
has its foundations in Community law itself' 77 The Advocate
General maintained that a Member State deprives the Commu-
nity law of its intended effect by failing to implement a direc-
tive.' 78 The Advocate General contended that this applies to
Community law that is directly applicable as well as to the pro-
visions of a directive that do not have direct effect. 79 The ab-
sence of direct effect does not signify that the effect sought by
the directive is not to confer rights on individuals, but only that
these rights are not sufficiently precise and unconditional as to
apply without the intervention of the Member State. 80 A di-
rective is binding as to its result, and this result can be to con-
fer rights on private parties.' 8' These rights must be protected
so that a Member State cannot rely on the irresponsibility of its
legislature to shirk its obligation to give full effect to Commu-
nity law. 182 This obligation includes making reparation for the
wrongs suffered by private parties as a result of a Member
State's violation of its Community obligations. 18 3 Based upon
the premise that unimplemented and imprecise directives still
176. Opinion of Advocate General Mischo, Francovich, slip op. 66.
177. Id. 42. The Advocate General recounted that "the right to repayment of
amounts charged by a Member State in breach of the rules of Community law is the
consequence and complement of the rights conferred on individuals by the Commu-
nity provisions." Id. 40 (quoting Barra v. Belgium and the City of Liege, Case 309/
85, [1988] E.C.R. 355, 376, [1988] 2 C.M.L.R. 409, 418). The Advocate General
stated that there is no distinction between an action in reimbursement and an action
in damages and therefore an individual should be compensated for breaches of Com-
munity law. Opinion of Advocate General Mischo, Francovich, slip op. 41.
178. Opinion of Advocate General Mischo, Francovich, slip op. 60.
179. Id.
180. Id.
181. Id. The Advocate General further noted that without a direct effect, the
fundamental necessity of a uniform application of Community law would find itself
less respected if the private parties, deprived of their rights because of a failure to
transpose a directive, demanded an approximately equivalent compensation. Id.
61.
182. Id. 65.
183. Id. 65. This conclusion follows from the Court's decision in Procureur de
la Rpublique and Comit6 National de D6fense contre l'Alcoolisme v. Alex
Waterkeyn,Joined Cases 314-16/81 & 83/82, [1982] E.C.R. 4337, [1983] 2 C.M.L.R.
145, where the Court stated that "[a]ll the institutions of the Member States con-
cerned must, in accordance with that provision, ensure within the fields covered by
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confer Community rights, both the Court of Justice and the
Advocate General concluded that Community law requires a
Member State to be liable in damages for its own failure to
implement a directive in a timely fashion. 8 4
III. THE FRANCOVICH JUDGMENT'S REQUIREMENT OF
DAMAGES UNDER NATIONAL LA W FOR A
MEMBER STATE'S BREACH OF
COMMUNITY LA W IS A
LOGICAL EXTENSION OF THE TREATY AND COURT OF
JUSTICE CASE LAW
Prior to Francovich, no direct remedy was available for indi-
viduals when a Member State failed to implement a direc-
tive.' 8 The Court of Justice had allowed directives to have di-
rect effect when the directive met the Court's requirements of
being sufficiently precise and conferring rights. 8 6 If the direc-
tive was insufficiently precise, however, the directive could not
have a direct effect, and an individual who was injured by the
Member State's failure to implement a directive was left with-
their respective powers, that judgments of the Court are complied with." Id. at 4360,
[1983] C.M.L.R. at 164. The consequence of this is that
under Article 169 of the Treaty the Member States are liable no matter
which organ of the State is responsible for the failure, and that a Member
State is responsible for the failure, and that a Member State may not plead
provisions, practices or circumstances existing in its internal legal system in
order to justify a failure to comply with the obligations and time-limits
under Community directives.
Commission v. Italy, Case 52/75, [1976] E.C.R. 277, 285, [1976] 2 C.M.L.R. 320,
330.
In Humblet, the Court expressly declared that the obligation to revoke the na-
tional bill contrary to Community law and to amend the effects that it produced,
results from the treaty which has force of law in the Member States following its
ratification and which is supreme over national law. Jean-E. Humblet v. Belgium,
Case 6/60, [1960] E.C.R. 559. The Court also affirmed strenuously that "[it follows
that by reason solely of the judgment declaring the Member State to be in default,
the State concerned is required to take the necessary measures to remedy its de-
fault." Commission v. France, Joined Cases 24 & 97/80, [1980] E.C.R. 1319, 1333.
184. Andrea Francovich and Danila Bonifaci v. Italy, Joined Cases C-6 & 9/90
(Eur. Ct. J. Nov. 19, 1991) (not yet reported).
185. See supra part I.D (discussing availability of remedy in damages prior to
Francovich).
186. Ursula Becker v. Finanzamt Miinster-Innenstadt, Case 8/81, [1982] E.C.R.
53, [1982] 1 C.M.L.R. 499.
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out a remedy. 18 7
Under Francovich, unimplemented directives that cannot
confer direct effect can create enforceable Community rights
after the expiration of the period allowed for implementation
of the directive.' The Court interpreted the Treaty as requir-
ing a remedy in damages for a violation of these Community
rights.'8 9 Francovich logically arises out of the Treaty and gen-
eral principles of Community law, and requires that national
courts recognize the Member States' liability for failing to im-
plement a directive. 9 ' Although all the Member States recog-
nize some type of Member State liability, Community law re-
quires that private law remedies or their equivalent be made
available for breaches of Community law.' 9 ' As a result of this
requirement, other Member State national rules similar to the
English Court of Appeal's ruling in Bourgoin will most likely
contravene Community law. 19 2
A. The Francovich Judgment Follows From Prior Court of Justice
Case Law
Prior to Francovich, absent an Article 169 proceeding, a
Member State's breach of its Treaty obligations in the form of
non-implementation of a directive within the prescribed period
was not recognized by the Court ofJustice.' 93 Francovich holds
187. See supra part I.D (discussing availability of damages for a Member State's
breach of Community law).
188. Francovich, slip op. 37.
189. Id.
190. See Rewe-Handelsgesellschaft Nord mbH & Rewe-Markt Steffen v.
Hauptzollamt Kiel, Case 158/80, [1981] E.C.R. 1805, [1982] 1 C.M.L.R. 449. In
Rewe, the Court stated that
the binding effect of a directive implies that a national authority may not
apply to an individual a national legislative or administrative measure which
is not in accordance with a provision of the directive which has all the char-
acteristics necessary to render possible its application by the court.
It follows from these considerations that a person may rely before the
national courts on his rights under the regulation.
Likewise, a national authority may not apply to a person legislative or
administrative measures which are not in accordance with an unconditional
and sufficiently clear obligation imposed by the directive.
Id. at 1837-38, [1982] 1 C.M.L.R. at 483.
191. See supra notes 104-108 and accompanying text (comparing private and
public law remedies in context of U.K. law).
192. See infra notes 238-247 (analyzing U.K. law in light of Francovich).
193. Cf supra parts C & D.I (discussing Article 169 proceedings and the Court
of Justice's recognition of Member State liability).
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that Member States breach their Treaty obligations as of the
moment that they fail to implement a directive within the pre-
scribed period. 194 This holding follows from the Court's judg-
ment in Slaughtered Cows as well as provisions of the Treaty.' 95
The Court held in Slaughtered Cows that a Member State fails to
fulfill its obligations under the Treaty when it fails to give ef-
fect to regulations which, under the Treaty, have general effect
throughout the Community.'9 6 Failure to give effect to a regu-
lation has the same result as not implementing a directive, i.e.,
failing to carry out the mandates of Article 189.' Both fail-
ures are a breach by the Member State of a Treaty provision.' 98
The extension of this reasoning to directives is reinforced by
the Court's judgments in Article 169 proceedings that Member
States fail to fulfill their Treaty obligations when they fail to
implement directives within the prescribed periods of time. 99
Article 189 of the Treaty provides that a directive shall be
binding upon each Member State to which it is addressed.20 0
A Member State defeats the mandatory language of Article 189
when it fails to implement a directive within the prescribed pe-
riod of time.20 1 In light of Article 5 principles of solidarity,
Member States fail to take all appropriate measures to ensure
fulfillment of the Member States' Treaty obligations when they
fail to implement directives.20 2
Member States are liable for damages caused by their
194. See Andrea Francovich and Danila Bonifaci v. Italy, Joined Cases C-6 & 9/
90 (Eur. Ct. J. Nov. 19, 1991) (not yet reported).
195. Slaughtered Cows, [1973] E.C.R. at 116, [1973] C.M.L.R. at 457; see EEC
Treaty, supra note 2, art. 189.
196. Slaughtered Cows, [1973] E.C.R. at 116, [1973] C.M.L.R. at 457.
197. Cf. id. (discussing effect of Regulations under Article 189).
198. Cf. id. Holding that the failure to give effect to regulations at the time of
issuance as a breach of Treaty obligations while simultaneously holding that no
breach exists as of the time when the period prescribed for implementation of a di-
rective has expired leads to an anomolous conclusion. Cf. id. at 116, [1973] C.M.L.R.
at 457; supra parts L.A & I.B. The result would be that one sentance within Article
189 is enforceable with regard to regulations; however, another sentance within that
same article is unenforceable with regard to directives. Cf Slaughtered Cows, [1973]
E.C.R. at 116, [1973] C.M.L.R. at 457.
199. See, e.g., EEC Treaty, supra note 2, art. 169; Commission v. Italy, Case 22/
87, [1989] E.C.R. 143.
200. EEC Treaty, supra note 2, art. 189.
201. See Curtin supra note 1, at 714; Green, supra note 7, at 296.
202. EEC Treaty, supra note 2, art. 5; see Temple Lang, supra note 30, at 647-48
(discussing Article 5 duties).
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breaches of Community law. 20 3 The Court of Justice has al-
ready held that the direct effect of a provision of Community
law can serve as a basis for an action in damages against a
Member State.20 4 The extension of this principle to directives '
that cannot confer direct effect is a logical consequence of this
earlier case law.20 5 The only difference between directives that
can and cannot produce direct effect lies in the precision of the
provisions.2 °6 Because both types of directives confer Com-
munity rights upon individuals, directives without a direct ef-
fect should be treated in the same fashion as those directives
that possess direct effect.20 7 Directives that cannot confer di-
rect effect, simply because imprecise language is employed,
should not remain incapable of serving as a basis for an action
in damages against the Member State. 0 8
The liability of Member States in damages also follows
from prior cases involving the repayment of charges levied in
violation of Community law.2 0 9 The Court of Justice has held
that the repayment of charges made in accordance with na-
tional law that is contrary to Community law is a consequence
of the rights conferred on individuals by Community provi-
sions. 210 As Advocate General Mischo pointed out in his opin-
ion in Francovich, no crucial difference exists between an action
203. See supra part I.D. 1 (describing Member State liability for breach of Com-
munity law).
204. See supra note 80 (discussing right to compensation for loss resulting from
breach of Community law).
205. Opinion of Advocate General Mischo, Andrea Francovich and Danila
Bonifaci v. Italy, Case C-6 & 9/90, slip op. 60 (Eur. Ct.J. Nov. 19, 1991).
206. See, e.g., Ursula Becker v. Finanzamt Miinster-Innenstadt, Case 8/81,
[1982] E.C.R. 53, 71, [1982] 1 C.M.L.R. 499, 512-13.
207. See Opinion of Advocate General Mischo, Francovich, slip op. 60.
208. See id.
209. See, e.g., Amministrazione delle Finanze dello Stato v. San Giorgio, Case
199/82, [1983] E.C.R. 3595, 3612, [1985] 2 C.M.L.R. 658; Comet BV v. Produkt-
schap voor Siergewassen, Case 45/76, [1976] E.C.R. 2043, [1976 Transfer Binder]
Common Mkt Rep. (CCH) 8383, at 7882; Rewe-Zentralfinanz eG and Rewe-Zentral
AG v. Landwirtschaftskammer fir das Saarland, Case 33/76, [1976] E.C.R. 1989,
1997-98, [1976 Transfer Binder] Common Mkt Rep. (CCH) 8382, at 7870.
210. San Giorgio, [1983] E.C.R. at 3612, [1985] 2 C.M.L.R. at 688. The Court in
San Giorgio stated that
entitlement to the repayment of charges levied by a Member State contrary
to the rules of Community law is a consequence of, and an adjunct to, the
rights conferred on individuals by the Community provisions prohibiting
charges having an effect equivalent to customs duties or, as the case may be,
the discriminatory application of internal taxes.
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in reimbursement and an action in damages. 21 ' This implies
that the availability of damages should be a consequence of the
rights conferred on individuals by Community law, including
the rights that the unimplemented directive would confer. 212
B. The Consequences of Francovich
1. The Francovich Judgment Requires the National Courts to
Provide an Effective Remedy in Damages
Francovich requires that Member States compensate indi-
viduals for damages arising out of the non-transposition of a
directive within the prescribed period when the directive con-
fers rights upon individuals.21 3 The language employed by the
Court ofJustice, however, may also represent a broader princi-
ple.21 4 The Court in Francovich has created a new Community
right that comes into existence when a Member State fails to
implement a directive. 5 The remedy for this right must be
appropriate, complete, and effective.21 6 The lack of a suitable
remedy under national law, or the ineffectiveness of a particu-
lar remedy within an existing national rule is irrelevant.2 7 As
the Court held most recently in Francovich, procedures and
remedies must be adapted as far as necessary to fully protect
the rights produced by Community law.21 8 National courts are
thus under a Community obligation to place individuals in the
same position as that in which they would have been had their
Id.; see Bourgoin SA v. Ministry of Agriculture, Fisheries and Food, [1986] 1 Q.B.
716, 763.
211. Opinion of Advocate General Mischo, Andrea Francovich and Danila
Bonifaci v. Italy, Joined Cases 6 & 9/90, slip op. $ 41 (Eur. Ct.J. Nov. 19, 1991); see
Bourgoin, [1986] 1 Q.B. at 763-65.
212. See Carmine Antonio Russo v. Azienda di Stato per gli Interventi sul Mer-
cato Agricolo (AIMA), Case 60/75, [1976] E.C.R. 45, 56.
213. Francovich, slip op. 39-40.
214. See id. 41. In referring to the conditions under which a Community law
violation would give rise to a cause of action in damages, the Court stated that
"[t]hese conditions are sufficient to generate for individuals a right to obtain restitu-
tion, which is based directly on Community law." Id. (unofficial translation).
215. Id.
216. See, e.g., Harz v. Deutsch Tradax GmbH, Case 79/83, [1984] E.C.R. 1921,
1941, [1986] 2 C.M.L.R. 430, 452; Temple Lang, supra note 30, at 650.
217. Regina v. Secretary of State for Transport, exparte Factortame Ltd., Case C-
213/89, [1990] E.C.R. 2433, 2473-74, [1990] 3 C.M.L.R. 1, 29; Temple Lang, supra
note 30, at 650.
218. Rewe-Zentralfinanz eG and Rewe-Zentral AG v. Landwirtschaftskammer
Saarland, Case 33/76, [1976] E.C.R. 1989, 1997, [1977] 1 C.M.L.R. 533, 550-51.
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right not been violated.21 9
The Francovich judgment provides a workable system of ef-
fective cooperation with the national courts. The courts of the
Member States are experienced in the administration and en-
forcement of laws of the general type produced by the Com-
munity. 2 ° The enforcement of Community law by the na-
tional courts contributes authority and legitimacy to unpopular
decisions by the Court of Justice.22 ' Such enforcement of
Community rights through the national jurisdictions creates a
reinforced internalization of Community law that serves to op-
timize the effect of directives in the national legal orders.22
The availability of damages for Member State breaches of
Community law provides the Community with an enforcement
power for Article 169 proceedings, albeit in an indirect way,
through suits by private individuals before national courts and
tribunals. 23 The Court of Justice, through an Article 177 ref-
erence, can determine the directives that may be relied upon as
creating such a Member State obligation. 2 4 A potential ad-
vantage of reliance on Article 177 references as compared to
Article 169's infringement proceedings, in instances involving
unimplemented directives, is the removal of control over en-
219. Curtin, supra note 1, at 738.
220. John Bridge, Procedural Aspects of the Enforcement of European Community Law
through the Legal Systems of the Member States, 13 EUR. L. REV. 28, 31 (1988).
221. See Temple Lang, supra note 30, at 653.
222. See PIERRE PESCATORE, THE LAW OF INTEGRATION: EMERGENCE OF A NEW
PHENOMENON IN INTERNATIONAL RELATIONS BASED ON THE EXPERIENCE OF THE EURO-
PEAN COMMUNITIES 104 (Christopher Dwyer translation 1974); Curtin, supra note 1, at
739. Judge Pescatore writes that
[t]he Member States must ... expect ... a challenge to their responsibility
before the domestic courts; but beyond these courts they will, through the
medium of references for preliminary rulings, find themselves before the
Community Court, which through the intermediary of the national judge
determines in the last analysis the nature, the scope and the content of the
obligations imposed on the States .... Hitherto the Member States could
yield to the temptation to take the liberties with Community law which a
State can all too easily allow itself in relation to the requirements of interna-
tional law; hitherto they could consider that such liberties would, at the
most, involve external repercussions. Within their internal order, on the
other hand, they could rely on complete impunity. In the Community sys-
tem, they will now be taken in the rear, and will be required to answer for
their behaviour before their own courts.
PESCATORE, supra, at 104.
223. Curtin, supra note 1, at 739.
224. EEC Treaty, supra note 2, art. 177.
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forcement from the Commission, where politics may be a con-
trolling factor, to individuals. 25 Injured citizens and under-
takings in the Member States would predictably seek judicial
resolution of a variety of problems, regardless of their political
implications.226
The limitations of the Francovich holding arise mainly from
the disparity of applicable standards and procedures within the
Community. 227 Francovich requires that a breach of Commu-
nity law through non-implementation of a directive must be
remedied within the national jurisdictions by applying national
remedies and procedures with respect to Member State liabil-
222
ity. 28 These national rules on Member State liability are un-
likely to be uniform. 2 9 In the absence of harmonization in this
area, the nature and effectiveness of the available remedies for
enforcement of Community law is likely to vary from Member
State to Member State. 3 0 Inequality and unfairness in the
protection of individual rights conferred by Community law is
a likely result.2 3' The experience of the Community demon-
strates that proper implementation of directives does not al-
ways produce the desired results.232 Such results are not only
due to misunderstanding, negligence, or reluctance on the
part of the Member States. 33 Some of the difficulties also may
be attributed to Community legislation that is ambiguous as a
result of its origins in political and legal compromise. 34
225. HJALTE RASMUSSEN, ON LAW AND POLICY IN THE EUROPEAN COURT OF JUS-
TICE 245 (1986); see PESCATORE, supra note 222, at 104-05. Judge Pescatore notes that
"Governments and Parliaments must understand that liberties taken with Commu-
nity Law, by maintaining or re-establishing protection, discrimination or obstacles to
trade, will finally be no longer worthwhile, since in the end the advantage will be
outweighed by the consequences in the form of repayment." Id.
226. RASMUSSEN, supra note 225, at 245.
227. See Bridge, supra note 220, at 32.
228. Andrea Francovich and Danila Bonifaci v. Italy, Cases C-6 & 9/90, slip op.
42 (Eur. Ct.J. Nov. 19, 1991) (not yet reported).
229. See id.
230. See Id.
231. Id.
232. See Prechal, supra note 61, at 472.
233. Id.
234. Id.
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2. Under U.K. Law, Private Law Remedies Must Be Awarded
for a Breach of the Treaty Giving Rise to
Enforceable Community Rights for the
Benefit of Individuals
Each of the national jurisdictions recognizes some type of
liability on the part of the Member States for their own unlaw-
ful acts under national law.2 35 The interpretation of the Mem-
ber State's liability under national law, however, will not always
be consistent with Community law requirements.236 Any such
conflicting liability schemes must be brought into conformity
with Community law.237
The Francovich judgment requires that national private law
remedies or their equivalent be made available for breaches of
Community law.238 As a result, Francovich conflicts with the
Court of Appeal's decision in Bourgoin, with respect to a breach
of statutory duty claim. In Bourgoin, the Ministry of Agriculture
imposed an embargo which the Court of Justice subsequently
held to be in breach of the Treaty.2 3 9 The Court of Appeal
concluded that although Article 30 was capable of giving rise
to rights in both private and public law, a breach of Article 30
by a Member State only sounded in public law, for which the
appropriate remedy was judicial review.2 40
It is likely that the Francovich judgment supersedes the
Court of Appeal's decision in Bourgoin. 4 1 In Francovich, the
Court of Justice held that a Member State's breach of Commu-
235. Curtin, supra note 1, at 732.
236. See, e.g., Bourgoin SA v. Ministry of Agriculture, Fisheries and Food, [1986]
1 Q.B. 716 (C.A.) (noting the various interpretations of the proper remedies for
Community rights).
237. See Regina v. Secretary of State for Transport, ex parte Factortame Ltd.,
Case C-213/89, [1990] E.C.R. 2433, 2473-74, [1990] 3 C.M.L.R. 1, 29 (holding that
Community law vests national judiciaries with powers necessary to ensure protection
of rights conferred, even if analogous powers do not exist under national law); Am-
ministrazione delle Finanze dello Stato v. Simmenthal S.p.A., Case 106/77, [1978]
E.C.R. 629, [1978] 3 C.M.L.R. 263 (holding that national courts must set aside any
provision of national law that conflicts with Community law).
238. See supra notes 104-108 (comparing private and public law remedies in con-
text of U.K. law).
239. Commission v. United Kingdom, Case 40/82, [1982] E.C.R. 2793, [1982] 3
C.M.L.R. 497.
240. Bourgoin, [1986] 1 QB. at 787.
241. Curtin, supra note 1, at 734-35 n.120.
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nity law vests individuals with a right to obtain damages. 42
The Court of Justice has repeatedly affirmed that effective re-
dress must be available under national laws and judicial proce-
dures. 24' The Francovich judgment suggests that U.K. courts
no longer retain the discretion to apply purely public law rem-
edies for a breach of Community law Where the result would
only be a declaration of illegality for the future.244 The ex-
isting public law remedies under Bourgoin would not effectively
protect Community rights as required by the Francovich judg-
ment. 245 Contrary to the rule of Bourgoin, all U.K. law must
allow a private law remedy for both a breach of Community
law under the Treaty and a breach of Community law as a con-
sequence of non-implementation of a directive. 246 This result
is proper because public law remedies are discretionary and do
not protect Community rights to the same extent as do private
law remedies which are not left to the discretion of the national
court.2 4 7
CONCLUSION
Through Francovich, the Court of Justice has taken a fur-
ther step at redressing the ineffective application and enforce-
ment of Community rights in the case of the non-implementa-
tion of directives. The effective protection of Community
rights has traditionally been important under Community law
and Court of Justice jurisprudence. The Francovich judgment
creates Community rights for individuals. In requiring a rem-
edy in damages for a breach of this right, the Court of Justice
effectively compels Member States to comply with Community
law, thus ensuring implementation of directives. The Court's
creation of this right and remedy is an important extension of
the Community's techniques for achieving a unified Europe.
James E. Hanft *
242. Andrea Francovich and Danila Bonifaci v. Italy, Joined Cases C-6 & 9/90,
slip op. 37 (Eur. Ct. J. Nov. 19, 1991).
243. Id.
244. See Garden Cottage Foods Ltd. v. Milk Marketing Bd., [1984] 1 App. Cas.
130 (Opinion of Lord Diplock); Curtin, supra note 1, at 734.
245. Francovich, slip op. 33.
246. See supra notes 104-108 (discussing private and public law remedies).
247. Id.
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